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AN AMERICAN MORALIST.*
BY PROF. L. M. BII-LI.\.
Dr. Paul C.a.rus, one of the editors of The Monist
and The Open Court— periodicals which rank among
the most important of the socio-philosophical reviews
of the United States of America
—
proposes, in three
lectures upon the " Ethical Problem," the adoption of
a course which might be considered as a compromise
between the utilitarian and the objective moral, or, as
he terms it, the " intuitionalist " school. He meets
the utilitarian principle at the outset by the following
declaration :
"We may say that the pursuit of happiness is a natural right
of man, but we cannot derive the moral ' ' ought " from the pursuit
of happiness. And the mere pursuit of happiness is not sufficient to
make a complete and worthy human life. On the contrary, the
mere pursuit of happiness wherever it prevails unchecked in the
soul of man is a most dangerous tendency, which unfits man for
business as well as for family life, and above all for ideal aspira-
tions. What is the reason that trustworthy persons, competent
workers, dutiful men and women are so rare ? It is simply be-
cause most people are too eager in their pursuit of happiness.
" The pursuit of happiness is not wrong. Enjoyment is not a
sin, and recreation is not improper. Yet it is wrong to make hap-
piness the sole aim of existence. We cannot live without enjoy-
ment; enjoyment keeps our minds healthy and buoyant; yet en-
joyment is not the purpose of life. Recreation is the rest we take
after our work is done. We do not work in order to have recrea-
tion ; but we seek recreation in order to do more work.
"If the pursuit of happiness is not sufficient to make man's
lite complete and worthy, what then is needed to make it so ? We
all know what is needed : it is ethics. Then let us have ethics
—
not mere theories about pleasurable sensations, but true ethics
ethics that are nobler than the mere pursuit of pleasure."
If these lofty conceptions do not suffice to gain our
sympathies for him, the author acquires a new claim
on us by virtue of the following declaration :
" I shall be glad to learn from my critics; and wherever any
one will convince me of an error, he will find me ready to change
my opinion and to accept the truth whatever it be."
Both from a scientific and a practical point of view,
I find his disagreement with those who would promote
the elevation of moral life without regard to philo-
sophical or religious opinions, or without fundamental
principles, a very serious matter.
* Translated from the Italian. The article appeared first in II Nuovo Ri-
sorgiinento Rivista di Filosojia, Scienze, Lettere, Educazionf e Studi Sociali
(Milan), a Roman Catholic magazine, and was republished in pamphlet form.
Dr. Carus's book had its origin in a controversy
between the author and the "Society of Ethical Cul-
ture," represented by The Etliical Record, of Philadel-
phia. Although we cannot agree with him in his posi-
tion that supernatural revelation is an impossibility,
we, nevertheless, approve of his conception of the
necessity of a philosophico-scientific basis of ethics—
a
necessity which, in our opinion, is a logical objective
exigency of speculative thought, and, socially, a sub-
jective exigency of our time and of modern education.
This view is, in our opinion, fully in accord with An-
tonio Rosmini's "Philosophy of Ethics" and "Phi-
losophy of Right [Diritto)."
The author, possessed of a happier memory than
ours, very well recollects the time when man was an
animal, living in herds with others of his kind ; and
he knows also, that at that early day higher ethics had
received but little development. But, as little by lit-
tle a higher ethics grew, society emerged from bar-
barism into the light of civilisation. And here criti-
cism grows somewhat laborious ; for, notwithstanding
his earnest profession of scientific research, the author's
method of procedure is that of the statement of aphor-
isms and definitions, each of which we should be jus-
tified in calling in doubt. In fact, it is these ver}'
aphorisms and definitions from which he proceeds,
that should, first of all, have been submittted to crit-
cal examination—even from a historical standpoint
—
if the author really wished to give ethics a scientific
basis. In agreement with Comte's conceptions of the
three natural stages of development, he declares that
the question, whether ethics is a science and can be
founded upon a scientific basis, is the same as that of
the reconciliation of religion and science, or of the de-
velopment of religion from infancy to its state of ma-
turity, from dualism to monism, from the mysticism
of a vague supernaturalistic speculation to the light of
positive certainty, from an authoritative and credulous
faith to the faith of scientific knowledge.
However correct and honest the intentions of the
author may be, we consider as truly deplorable his
arbitrary conception of religion, which, in his presup-
position undiscussed, and, for him, admitting of no
discussion, is nothing but a human fact, while to us
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the elevation of man to the Absolute is itself a work
of God. If the author's supposition were true, his
course would have to be approved of, although the
difficulty would remain, whether a scientific religion
could be understood by the multitude, who might
know it generally, but not scientifically.
Nor are we less surprised at the author's confound-
ing the ideas "vague," "supernatural," and "fan-
tastic "; the fantastic, the ideal, and the supernatural
being three orders much at variance with facts. Alto-
gether, Dr. Carus's point of departure differs in noth-
ing from that of Comte.
And thus, when he comes to establish the "basis"
of ethics— always in aphoristic form— he states the
hypothesis, that knowledge is a representation of
facts—a definition of which our readers know, beyond
doubt, is disputable.
It is true, the author attempts to found ethics upon
reason, upon the immutable and necessary order of
things, and he deserves praise for thus having elevated
himself above the level of the utilitarian ; but, in de-
fault of tradition and through excessive fear of the
supernatural and mystical, he falls into the error of a
material monism and fails, at the same time, to give
his doctrine a foundation.
However, the author is worthy and capable of
something better, as may be seen in his beautiful ob-
servation in censure of the ferocious and pharisaical
theory, which pretends to derive all moral sentiment
from egotism. Here he is entirely in accord with the
Italian school, and I doubt if the remarks he makes
could be improved upon.
Only it is deplorable that, owing to his disregard-
ing a great part of ancient and modern philosophic
speculation, he should not be able, while face to face
with the utilitarians, to perceive others than the ranks
of those whom he terms intuitionalists, wrongfully
accusing them of ignoring and of refusing to demon-
strate, by natural and scientific methods, the reasons
or motives underlying morality, of making duty a
mystery, etc., etc. All this we naturally read with
something akin to ill-will here, in the home of the
philosophy of right (diritio) ; in fact, in Europe gen-
erally, where for so many centuries the supreme mo-
tives of the good have been scientifically investigated.
He likewise touches upon the problem of freewill
and believes to have found its solution, but does not
seem to be well aware of the main difficulty, which
consists in this, that, on the one hand, the fact of free-
will is attested by the consciousness ; on the other
hand, that will without motive is an absurdity. Cer-
tainly. But, with the usual defect of Anglo-Ameri-
cans—the tendency to vaporings, as in the McKinley
bill, so in philosophical speculation,—the work of cen-
turies,—he falls into a twofold error: historical and
philosophical. His classification of those who have
entered into an investigation of this problem into theo-
logians, who hold freewill a will without motive and
an inscrutable mystery, and freethinkers, so called,
who place it among illusions, is much too superficial.
Assuredly, these two views are both false ; but, if our
author had kept accurate account of philosophical tra-
dition, and above all, if he had paid closer attention
to Italian philosophy, and to that of Rosmini in par-
ticular, he would have observed that the difficulty has
been by many not only recognised, but also sur-
mounted.
In fact, the doctrine of practical judgment, in our
opinion, while, on the one hand, it justifies the e.xist-
ence of freedom of choice, is not satisfied with merely
affirming it, but demonstrates the operation by a keen
analysis ; and, on the other hand, confutes in the best
possible manner determinism, physiological, as well
as psychological and rationalistic. And what is this
"best possible manner"? That of conceding, or
rather, of comprehending whatever truth there may be
in those views, in order the better to avoid the fallacies
they may contain. An act not determined by a rea-
son is an absurdity. Decidedly. But a free will con-
sists precisely in the ability to determine, in the abil-
ity to make real a given reason, a given impulse, a
given sentiment. How is freewill reconcilable with
the evident subjection of our acts to the status of the
nervous system, the status of health or disease, ad-
ventitious or constitutional, individual or hereditary?
Free choice is an act of reflection, or rather, one of
the higher acts of reflection. Now, reflection requires
a certain status of order and calmness in our functions,
which, for instance, does not exist, at least not with-
out great expenditure of force, in fever, hysterics, ex-
cessive pain, extraordinary somnolence, or any ardent
superexcitation. But it is none the less true that these
same conditions, favorable or unfavorable as they may
be to reflection, and to the exercise of free choice, have
for the most part their origin in liberty of choice itself,
as in disease which has been neglected or aggravated,
or criminally transmitted to descendants, or in cases
of exaltation not restrained at the outset, or to assume
a less ignoble case, in any excessive lassitude or strain,
whether of muscle or brain, consequent upon hard
labor.
At times Dr. Cams recognises the difficulty, but
then again, following the imperfect theory of some
German moralists, he confounds liberty of will with
freedom from passion, and ends by admitting liberty
solely in connection with the Good. Now, it is very
true that liberty makes for the Good. It is very true
that he who does good is freer than he who works
evil ; that the practice of virtue not only educates and
refines sentiment, but also strengthens freedom of will,
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just as, on the other hand, yielding to certain vices
weakens, and, in the end, almost entirely nullifies it.
But it is none the less true that liberty presents itself
in connection with the Evil as well as in connection
with the Good. So true is this that, before entering
on the examination of certain crimes, men dften sus-
tain fierce struggles with themselves in the endeavor
to silence the voice of nature, of conscience, of blood
;
as may especially be noticed in criminal cases of a
political nature, and in all those which are executed with
open predetermination and which are designed to some
end of vast importance. Nor is it the case that those
who have preceded Dr. Cams have not well distin-
guished between necessity and compulsion—a very old
and well-known distinction. On the contrary, he him-
self does not well distinguish Uhcrtas a coactioiic from
libcrtas a iicicssHatc, in which freedom of choice pre-
cisely consists. Lihcrias a ncccssiiale, we repeat, does
not in itself denote absence of reason, but determines
to itself the preponderant reason.
We must say, however, b}' way of causcrie, as the
French would put it, that we have been better enter-
tained than \''i& at first expected to be, by this work
of the author of "Meliorism."* We find two good
reasons for not being displeased with it.
The first is the author's innate goodness and lofti-
ness of spirit, which constantly reveals itself in his
combating egotism, in his lifting up his readers out
of the slough of " Spencerianism," and in the fact
that he reposes the supreme ethical law in ijiitli. Al-
though rejecting his doctrine of representation, f we
cannot but congratulate Dr. Carus on his happy dec-
laration : that ethics should recognise as its principal
basis the search for truth and adaptation thereto
;
that an honest inquiry into truth is the condition of
all ethics, and that faithfulness and obedience to truth
includes all the laws that a system of ethics could
contain.
ROSMINI'S PHILOSOPHY.
Prof. L. M. Billi.^ is a Roman Catholic and a dis-
ciple of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. There is a deep-
seated and radical difference between our view and
that of our critic, and 3'et there is also in some points
* This is the title of another of the author's works, and, in fact, the one
which he applies to his system.
t For the convenience of our readers, especially the young and strangers,
we may repeat the reasons upon which we reject the theory of representation :
That which is known is the truth ; that which is known is the idea. Idea and
truth are entirely wholly one, and are wholly one also with the object thought
of. If, instead of saying that the idea is the object thought of, we say that the
idea is, through sense-reminiscence, a representation of the object, it would
come to pass that we could never think of any object, but always of its repre
sentation
: therefore, I could not think: one, two, three—the thought itself
would be impossible. Moreover, the representation could not be thought, if
not by means of a certain resemblance or similitude with the object thought
of; this similitude is what is actually thought : it is a common element ; it is
the unity of the representation and that which is represented. Idea in this
sense is the representation of many things similar to eacli other, but this is
not its definition. ( See Rosmini, Psychology, vol. II, p, 1339.
J
of great consequence a striking agreement. As there
is no hope of a conversion on either side, we may for-
bear arguing the case and be satisfied with a simple
statement, which will contrast the two world-concep-
tions. But before entering into a discussion of the
present subject, it seems advisable to sketch the phi-
losoph)^ of Professor Billia's great master, who may
fairly be regarded as the most representative Roman
Catholic thinker of modern times.
Rosmini was born in March, 1797, in Roveredo,
Tyrol, the eldest son of a wealthy and noble family.
He attended the Lyceum atTrient and the University
of Padua, and selected in 1821 the ecclesiastical call-
ing with the avowed purpose of giving to theology a
sound philosophical basis. In his love of the church
and eagerness for reform, he became the founder of a
new religious order, the Society of the Brothers and
Sisters of Charity, popularly called in Italy "The Ros-
minians." He joined Piedmont in 1830 and Pope Pius
IX. in 1848, under whose reform-ministry he became
the papal minister of education. At the outbreak of
the Roman revolution, he retired from public life and
died July ist, 1855 at Stresa.
In spite of all his devotion not only to the church
but also to the Pope personally, whom he followed
into his exile at Gal-ta, one of his writings "On the
Five Wounds of the Church " has been placed upon
the Index.
Rosmini's numerous, and partly very ponderous,
writings are little accessible to the English speaking
world. His works were collected (according to Meyer's
Konversations-Lexikon) in seventeen volumes (Milan,
1S42-44), and he wrote, according to Davidson, not
fewer than ninety-nine various publications, books,
and among them very voluminous books, articles and
pamphlets, on philosophical, theological, ethical, legal,
and miscellaneous subjects. Among them are claimed
to be the most important ones, " Nuovo saggio suU' ori-
gine delle idee," 3 vol. ; and " Philosophia del diritto."
The best known Italian works on his life are by Tho-
maseo (Turin, 1855) and Bernardi (Pinerolo, i860).
There is a translation extant of Rosmini's " Nouvo
saggio suir origine delle idee," entitled "New Essay
on the Origin of Ideas " (London, 18S3-84), published
by the English branch of the Rosminians which is at-
tached to the ancient church of St. Etheldreda, Ely
Place, Holborn. The most convenient work for Eng-
lish readers will be Davidson's book " Rosmini's Phil-
osophical System" (London, 18S2).
In order to overcome doubt and unbelief Rosmini
attempted to establish a rational basis of the Christian
faith, thus to work out a conciliation of reason and re-
ligion. He opposed the sensualism and empiricism as
represented in Italy by Gioja and Ramagnosi, and pro-
pounded a philosophical system which in accord with
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Descartes's idealism was expected to be in agreement
with the doctrines of the church.
The Encyclopaedia Britannica characterises Ros-
mini's philosophy as follows :
" Rosmini, contemplating the position of recent philosophy
from Locke to Hegel, and having his eye directed to the ancient
and fundamental problem of the origin, truth, and certainty of our
ideas, wrote :— ' If philosophy is to be restored to love and respect,
I think it will be necessary, in part, to return to the teachings of
the ancients, and in part to give those teachings the benefit of
modern methods' (' Theodicy,' n. 148). Pursuing, therefore, the
now generally approved method of the observation of facts, he most
carefully examined and analysed the fact of human knowledge, and
obtained the following results :
" i) That the notion or idea of being or existence in general
enters into, and is presupposed by, all our acquired cognitions, so
that, without it, they would be impossible.
" 2) That this idea is essentially objective, inasmuch as what
is seen in it is as distinct from and opposed to the mind that sees
it as the light is from the eye that looks at it.
"3) That it is essentially true, because 'being' and 'truth'
are convertible terms, and because in the vision of it the mind
cannot err, since error could only be committed by a judgment,
and here there is no judgment, but a pure intuition affirming noth-
ing and denying nothing.
"4) That by the application of this essentially objective and
true idea the human being intellectually perceives, first, the animal
body individually conjoined with him, and then, on occasion of
the sensations produced in him }iol by himself, the causes of those
sensations, that is, from the action felt he perceives and affirms an
agent, a being, and therefore a true thing, that acts on him, and
he thus gets at the external world,—these are the true primitive
judgments, containing (a) the subsistence of the particular being
(subject), and (/<) its essence or species as determined by the qual-
ity of the action felt from it (predicate).
" 5) That reflexion, by separating the essence or species from
the subsistence, obtains the full specific idea (universalisation),
and then from this, by leaving aside some of its elements, the ab-
stract specific idea (abstraction).
" 6) That the mind, having reached this stage of development,
can proceed to further and further abstracts, including the first
principles of reasoning, the principles of the several sciences, com-
plex ideas, groups of ideas, and so on without end.
"7) Finally, that the same most universal idea of being, this
generator and formal element of all acquired cognitions, cannot
itself be acquired, but must be innate in us, implanted by God in
our nature. Being, as naturally shining to our mind, must there-
fore be what men call the light of reason. Hence the name Ros-
mini gives it of ideal being ; and this he laid down as the one true
fundamental principle of all philosophy, and the supreme criterion
of truth and certainty."
We are in sympathy with the aspiration represented
by Rosmini, of rationalising the Christian faith. We
do not believe that Rosmini was successful in his ef-
forts ; indeed, we think that he could not be, because
he took a wrong start and was blinded by the firm and
fore-determined conviction that the Christianity of the
church was undeniable and indubitable truth. Never-
theless, we regard the effort of any man of conciliating
his religion with science and rational thought as praise-
worthy, and we go so far as to say that the gist of Chris-
tianity, i. e. the main tenets of Christian ethics, admit
indeed of a perfectly rational foundation. We deny,
however, the possibility of rationalising the dogmas of
the church. We see in them only the crystallised myth-
ology of past ages, which, when regarded as a myth-
ology, is profound, venerable, full of oddly and mys-
teriously expressed truths, but when regarded as truth
itself, are utterly absurd.
We agree with Professor Billia in substance while
we disagree in form. We agree in rejecting hedon-
ism, or the pleasure theory in ethics, and we agree in
accepting the ethics of a stern search for truth. Neither
of us can think of speaking of ethics as independent of
a definite world- conception. Both of us regard moral-
ity simply as the practical application of our deepest
religious convictions concerning that which we have
found to be the truth. Yet we disagree as to the form
in which we cast our convictions. Rosmini and his
school favor mystical expressions and extol the tradi-
tion of the church in comparison to the results of mod-
ern science. We, on the contrary, do not rest satisfied
until the mysteries disappear like fog befoi'e the sun
;
and while we place little reliance upon ecclesiastical
traditions, we rely mainly upon that which God's rev-
elation in nature teaches us through science.
Thus my Roman Catholic critic who enjoys the ad-
vantage of living in the cradle of an ancient civilisa-
tion and the very home of the " Filosophia del diritto"
jokes at my ingenuousness of accepting the theory of
evolution. He does not attempt to overthrow the
theory of evolution, and does not seem to expect me
to take the trouble of proving it to him. I hope, he
will not be offended when I openl)' confess that the
smile was fully reciprocated on my part. It is not ig-
norance of the philosophical and ecclesiastical tradi-
tions, nor a horror of the supernatural that prevent me
from accepting an ecclesiastical philosophy as is that
of Rosmini's. Yet Professor Billia, it appears to me,
does not appreciate the full weight of overwhelming
proofs which give evidence to the truth of the theory
of evolution.
Professor Billia, so it seems to us, still regards re-
ligious truths (i. e., the moral tenets which confessedly
contain the gist of religion) as incompatible with the
results of modern science. This may be excusable in
the face of the fact that almost all modern ethicists
who accept the theory of evolution, Spencer, Hoff-
ding, Gizycki, etc., are hedonists. We trust that the
theory of evolution, far from overthrowing the moral
truths of religion will give them a scientific and relia-
ble basis. If evolution is true, we must live in obe-
dience to the law of evolution. In that case, we can-
not fashion our lives according to our pleasure, for the
facts of nature sternly demand, by penalty of degenera-
tion and perdition, a constant progress and higher de-
velopment of our souls. Here we are in accord with
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the old Hebrew and Christian tradition. Ethics is not
subjective ; our rules of conduct are not self-made ;
there is an objective authority which must be obeyed,
whose will is plainly recognised in the laws of nature
and in the course of evolution.
We have no "fear of the supernatural"; we simply
regard its conception as an error. To Professor Billia
religious truths are acquired by a supernatural revela-
tion, and scientific truths b}' a natural revelation. The
former only are regarded as holy and infallible, not
the latter, which are rather dubitable and unreliable.
To us all truth is holy. In so far as truth is a state-
ment of fact, a description of some feature or part of
the objective reality in whicli and of which we are,
truth is always divine. Thus religion, or our attempt
of living the truth, no less than science, or our search
for the truth, are in one respect "human facts" and
in another respect "a work of God."
The main difference between our Catholic critic
and ourselves consists in this : that he regards the
traditional authority of the Church as ultimate, while
we replace it by the authority of objective truth, prov-
able according to the usual methods of science.
We do not intend to enter into a discussion of mi-
nor points ; so we abstain here from repeating our doc-
trine of freewill, simply stating that we do not feel guilty,
as Professor Billia maintains, of having confounded
" liberty of will with freedom from passion"; on the
other hand, we do not see how the Italian school can
boast of having solved the problem, while claiming to
have confuted " in the best possible manner determin-
ism, physiological, ps3'chological, and rationalistic."
We further abstain from discussing whether or not and
how far there is an agreement of our position with Au-
guste Comte's positivism. We concur with Comte in
the recognition of the scientific method ; we depart
from his agnosticism and man}' details of his philo-
sophical views ; and, finally, we only hint here that
when the author of "The Ethical Problem" spoke of
the " intuitionalists," he did not have reference to the
" Objective school " of Rosmini. Intuitionalism is a
peculiarly English phenomenon, which can only in one
point, indeed, in the main point, be compared to Ros-
mini's view, viz. : in its strange tenet of the intuitive
apprehension of truth. This latter point, however, is
of sufficient consequence to deserve a few additional
remarks.
Professor Billia regards it as a matter of course
that "the doctrine of representation" is wrong. By
doctrine of representation he understands our proposi-
tion that knowledge is a representation of facts and that
truth is a correct representation of facts. According to
his view ' ' idea and truth are wholly one, and are wholly
one with the object thought of." This sentence, if I
understand this rather mystifying explanation cor-
rectly, means, that ideas are directly perceived in the
same way as sensations— the A/isi-haiittii^i-ii of our
senses. Our sensations (i. e., in Kant's terminology
our -:/// ,f</i'(?///(','/^s,'-i:7/, often translated by "intuitions")
are not subject to doubt ; they are immediately per-
ceived as real ; and a similar immediateness has been
attributed bj' many philosophers to certain very gen-
eral or universal truths.
Rosmini regards "being" and truth as identical.
We make a distinction between reality and truth.
Sensations are "real"; we cannot say that sensations
as such are either true or untrue. For instance, 1 feel
a slight pang of hunger in the stomach : Is there any
truth or untruth in this feeling ? Or a certain color
sensation takes place in the eye : Is there any truth
or untruth in this sensation? Sensations are simply
real ; they are the data of our experience, out of which
we construct our ideas. But these ideas if they prop-
erl}' represent the objects sensed, are true ; if not,
they are untrue. Truth and untruth always presup-
pose mental activity. If I, having a color sensation
which is a subjective hallucination, judge that there is
an object before me, I am mistaken ; the sensation in
that case is not wrong, but my judgment of it is wrong.
The sensation is right enough ; it is caused somehow
according to the laws of nature; but I have allowed
myself to be misguided by its appearance.
Thus truth is never a thing of immediate percep-
tion, but always the product of mental activity. The
very laws of mind would have to be reversed, should
truth be directly perceived as are sensations.
Professor Billia assumes that if an idea, "through
sense-reminiscence," were "a representation of the
object,"
' It would come to pass tliat we could never think of any ob-
ject, but always of its representation ; ttierefore,
he adds,
"I could not think one, two, three—the thought itself would
be impossible."
Why? Is this not self-mystification ? Let us not
stultify ourselves. By having and thinking a repre-
sentation, we think of the object represented. A cer-
tain feeling, being caused somehow, say by a certain
sense-impression, comes to represent an object, and
thus it stands for it ; it symbolises it. This is the na-
ture of thought. Whenever the symbol is felt, the
object represented in it is thought of.
There is a long distance between Alessandria in
Northern Italy and Chicago in the prairies of Illinois,
but it almost seems to us that the distance between
the spiritual roads of Professor Billia and ourselves is
greater still. Centuries seem to lie between us. But
in spite of all our divergencies we observe with pleas-
ure a certain concurrence in some most important
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points. We have in this sketch attempted to repre-
sent the case with faithful impartiality, not attenuat-
ing and not extending either the differences or agree-
ments. P. c.
KNOWLEDGE.
We define knowledge (i) as a representation of facts
in sentient symbols; and (2) as a description of facts
(Kirchhoff). In the former sense we limit the term to
sentient beings, in the latter we apply it generally. The
usage of the verb "to know" is limited exclusively to
the former sense, for we do not say, that a book
"knows " something. The latter sense is more gen-
eral. We say that a man has knowledge, and also
that a book contains knowledge.
The root of the words to know, gnosccrc, yiyvcoa-
KEiv, erkennen, etc., is the same as in ken, can, konnen,
denoting an ability to do something.* It signifies the
mental disposition which makes a man fit to accomplish
his purpose. It is his state of being acquainted with
the facts with which he has to deal.
What is the nature of this state, and how does it
originate ?
The origin of knowledge, i. e., the act of becoming
acquainted with things, of acquiring knowledge, of
perceiving, is called cognition.
A sentient being is exposed to impressions of the
surrounding world. The various objects make various
impressions upon the different senses, and these im-
pressions are remembered. Certain characteristic fea-
tures of their forms remain and can be revived by an
appropriate stimulus, so as to be felt again. As soon
as a certain event (say a ray of sunshine previously
registered by the eye as light and by the skin as a pe-
culiar kind of warmth) impresses itself upon the sense-
organs, it revives the memory-structures of the same
kind. The feeling of the present sense impression is
felt to be the same in kind as those prior sense-im-
pressions, the vestiges of which are preserved in the
revived memory-structures. The reference of a sense-
impression to the memorj'-structure of its class is a
primitive perception, and perception is the simplest
act of cognition.
Facts are pictured in sensations, and these pictures
represent the facts. A certain feeling has come to
stand for a certain object, event, or phenomenon. The
presence of this feeling signifies the presence of its
* The verb " to know " is used in Genesis iv, i, in the sense of " causing
to bring forth, or to produce." So the German erkennen (a reflex causative verb
oi kennen, meaning "causing one's self to know") and tlie Greek yiyin'jGKEiv
have the same double meaning. Is it a strange coincidence only or a fact of
deeper significance that these verbs are used to express two so heterogeneous
acts as" knowing and begetting"? If it is a confusion between two roots of a
similar or the same sound, it is certainly very, very old and dates back to the
period before the separation of the various .^ryan branches. Should the co-
incidence arise from the same conception which in more recent times gave
two meanings to the words "potent " and " impotent "?
respective and analogous object, event, or phenome-
non, and this state of the representativeness of various
feelings, in its higher perfection, is called knowledge.
On a higher level of mentality facts are described in
names or word-symbols,* and these names represent
whole classes of facts.
Knowledge is rendered definite by naming. A sen-
tient being can be said to really know a thing only when
he has named it. We know only that which we can
clearly describe in words. Names label things and
enable us to handle them in our minds without diffi-
cult)'. They are symbols of the essential features of
things.
Briefly : Knowledge is an appropriate representa-
tion of facts in mental symbols, and the purpose of
knowledge is the ability of appropriately dealing with
facts.
The amount of mentality of a mental being is meas-
ured by its knowledge, or rather by its ability of operat-
ing with knowledge. Knowledge is that which consti-
tutes the power of mental beings, and without knowl-
edge man's dignity would be naught. Knowledge is
and must be the basis of all action; for actions with-
out knowledge are mere reflex motions.
Knowledge being of paramount importance, the
acquisition of knowledge forms an indispensable and
the most prominent department in human life. The
acquisition of knowledge is the department of science.
The aim of science is to make knowledge not onlj'
reliable, but also handy. The former is obtained by
critique, the latter by classification, and both are called
" S3'stem."
System means the arrangement of all parts into one
whole. A set of facts or events (in order to be sys-
tematic) must be formulated so as to include, in a
methodical order, all possibilities. This will exhaust
the subject and at the same time allow us to survey
the whole field, as it were, at a glance. System ren-
ders [acts i<bfrsichf/ich.'\ Having knowledge systemat-
ically arranged, we can readily assign new facts of a
well-known class to their proper places in the system ;
we understand them at once and can predetermine the
course of their events even before a renewed observa-
tion. We can also exercise critique. We can judge
of the reliability of accounts concerning facts, for we
recognise at once contradictory elements as inharmo-
nious with the rest.
* Mathematical and algebraic symbols must in this connection also be
regarded as words.
t There is an appropriate word missing in English to denote the German
iibersiclitlich and Uebcrsichtlichkeit, "surveyable and surveyability." Survey-
ability is more than "clearness" or "lucidity"; it is a systematic arrange-
ment in which one readily finds one's bearings. It is that order which makes
a domain of science easily surveyed. Surveyability is attained by methodical
arrangement ; it is the product of " system "; it is the advantage derived from
methodical arrangement.
THE OPEN COURT. 3589
Thus system, on the one hand, impHes the com-
pleteness of parts presented with greatest economy,
and on the other hand, affords the means of criticism
for the elimination of faulty statements, contradictions,
and errors. p. c.
CURRENT TOPICS.
In a tone of apology the Chicago papers deplore the unavoid-
able absence of Chicago "sports" from the prize tights at New
Orleans. Even the suburban village of Oshkosh displays more
public spirit than we do in this matter, as appears from the fol-
lowing humiliating confession which I find in this morning's paper:
"A delegation of twelve from Oshkosh will pass through the city
bound for the fights to-day, but the Chicago contingent at the
arena promises to be very small." The best that Chicago can do
under the circumstances is to send "regrets" and the customary
fashionable excuse of a " prior engagement," to meet the President
of the United States There is also an explanation to the effect
that the prize-fighting element, and the patrons of the prize ring
in Chicago are all Democrats, whose presence is earnestly desired
at Washington to give tone to the inauguration of Mr. Cleveland.
A proper complaint is made of the bungling mismanagement by
which two such interesting Democratic festivals as the inaugura-
tion of the President at Washington, and a prize-fight at New Or-
leans should have been appointed so near in time together, and in
cities so far apart, whereby the Chicago "contingent" was pre-
vented from attending both entertainments. The prize-fight should
have been at Washington, or the inauguration at New Orleans.
In the l-'tn-iiiii for March is an article on "The Science of
Municipal Corruption," by a skilled professor who prudently with-
holds his name. He speaks with the confidence of an expert. It
is a very unpleasant article, because after you have read a page or
two of it, you cannot help doubting your own honesty. When the
professor says, and proves it, that of the "typical Legislature,
City Council, orBca d of Education," two thirds are open to bribes,
and only one third is honest, we cannot help thinking that the odds
are two to one against ourselves, and that if we were members of
the " typical Legislature or City Council " we should probably be
numbered among the two thirds. Riches breed corruption, and
character too often depends en opportunity. Considering the low
standard of public life, we have reason to be proud that thirty-
three and a third per cent, of our public men are honest men.
*
Having, very likely, been for a long time in the business of
buying and selling men, the professor has no trouble in sorting
them into grades and qualities as if they were potatoes in the mar-
ket ; and the information he gives about prices will be found valu-
able to those who may have occasion to buy a few men for any
particular purpose. He says that the cheapest are "the leaders
of workingmen and farmers' political movements." I hope this is
not true, but it agrees with the opinion of a railroad-lawyer of my
own acquaintance who told me that a "granger" legislature was
the cheapest he ever bought. Second in cheapness come "the
editors of country newspapers, and newspapers in small cities,"
—
the editors in big cities, of course, command higher prices,—but
next in cheapness to the country editors come "country lawyers,
and a certain class of city lawyers " ; and then come " clergymen
who drift into practical politics "
:
these, remarks the professor,
"can almost always be bought by indirect methods." It will be
noticed that the scale of prices rises as men rise out of poverty,
the poorest being the cheapest, and the gloomy moral at the bot-
tom is this: never elect or appoint a poor man to office. "Moral
reputation," says the professor, " is a flimsy security for conduct
;
financial competence is a good security." While there may be a
grain of melancholy truth in that, it only adds to the glory of the
poor men who have characters above temptation, and the number
of these is legion. They are immensely in the majority ; and I
would rather trust with an office a poor man of "moral reputa-
tion," than a rich man who is honest because he has money enough
to make him so.
An unfortunate accident happened last Tuesday at the Dem-
ocratic convention ; an ,\merican was put on the ticket by mistake.
His name is Gastfield, and he was nominated for the office of city
clerk. The explanation of the blunder is that the convention was
cheated by the German shape of his name. When the philologers
of the party discovered the mistake it was too late to correct it,
for the nomination had been made. They showed, however, that
if the convention had possessed any linguistic sense it would have
detected the imposition, for had the name been really German it
would have been spelled Gastfeld, and not Gastfield, a very clumsy
forgery or imitation of German. The leading Democratic paper
of the city, referring editorially to the misadventure, says : " Gast-
field was chosen on the mistaken inference that he was a German.
A fair estimate of the convention's regard for and acquaintance
with Germans and the German language may be gathered from the
fact that the terminal syllable of Gastfield's name was accepted
without question as an assurance of his being a German of the
Germans. As a matter of fact Gastfield neither speaks nor under-
stands the German language." Many strong partisans, interested
in the success of the ticket, express a hope that Mr. Gastfield will
yet be able to prove to the satisfaction of the party that he is not
an American.
-X-
Some time ago I made a plea in The Open Cmir/ in behalf of
"distinguished," a flattery weary and worn. I thought it was lime
to take the word "off post" as we used to say in the army, and re-
lieve it of duty ; but my plea was disregarded, and the tired adjec-
tive is working harder than before. If we must please one another
by an exchange of genteel compliments why not press into the ser-
vice " eminent," " celebrated," and " illustrious " ; handsome, full-
sized words, which with scarcely anything to do, are idling their
time away. Nearly all the work of mutual admiration is thrown
upon "distinguished." Not long ago I visited the Illinois Legis-
lature, and my first impression was that the General Assembly was
not quite so refined a body of statesmen as a legislature ought to
be, for every member was smoking like a Chicago tug boat, and
the Speaker of the House was just faintly visible through a dense
tobacco cloud that wrapped him in a halo like a London fog ; but
I soon found that my estimate was wrong. I discovered that the
Legislature was composed of extremely courteous men, for when-
ever one member spoke of another he always referred to him as
the "distinguished gentleman" from Pike, Jo Daviess, Cook, or
whatever the county was. Not even a council of Spanish grandees
could have been more punctilious in exalting one anolher, but the
performance became insipid at last from pure monotony. It was
like the tintinnabulations of a cow-bell. It had no musical "scale,"
no positive, comparative, and superlative degrees. Every man was
"distinguished"; neither less nor more than that, and it would
have been a relief to have heard the word "illustrious," or even
" pusillanimous," for a change.
*
* *
It has been intimated that my former comments on "distin-
guished" came from envy; and that I was merely jealous of
greater men. I do not believe that, and yet I am not bold enough
to deny it, for I doubt that any man can tell how much of the cen-
sure he scatters about him springs from ignoble jealousy. The
taunt, however, will not fit me now, for since I wrote that other
criticism, the "distinguished" compliment has been given to me.
Last week an eloquent writer of Chicago presented me with one
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of his books, and on the fly leaf he spoke of me as his "distin-
guished friend." I am very proud of that, and I think better of
the word than I did when almost everybody was "distinguished"
except me. Still, I favor a change, for the flattery is becoming
too promiscuous altogether. Within a week I have read of the
"distinguished" fighter Corbett. and the "distinguished" Apostle
Paul. Also, I have seen the falls of Niagara complimented as the
"distinguished " cataract, while the Vice-President of the United
States at a banquet spoke of Mr. Stevenson as " the distinguished
gentleman who will in a few days succeed me." I think there
must be a change, for the word has reached the climax of adula-
tion in a description of that identical Mr. Stevenson, who appears
in Monday's paper as a "distinguished communicant, " because
he went to church on Sunday and patronised the sacrament. The
courtly chronicler says: "While the pastor did not allude per-
sonally to the distinguished communicant, there was something in
his discourse that seemed to fit the honors he has achieved." Even
the Lord's supper became "distinguished" by the presence of Mr.
Stevenson. Above all that fawning praise, I hear the tones of
Thomas Hood's democracy ringing like a chime of bells :
" One place there is—beneath the burial sod,
Where all mankind are equalised by death
;
Another place there is—the fane of God,
Where all are equal who draw living breath."
*
A dispatch, dated Sydney, February 26, says : " King George
Tubu, of the Tonga Islands, is dead." This is an important an-
nouncement, for the death of that monarch presents a fine oppor-
tunity for statesmanship. I know not where the Tonga Islands
are, but I am quite sure they will make an excellent "coaling sta-
tion" for our fleet in case of war, and that if we do not " seize "
this opportunity to annex them, England will. As King George
Tubu is dead, we can get the islands without having to pay him a
pension of $20 000 a year. Besides, they will be some consolation
for the loss of Hawaii, a bit of prey, which, having eagerly pursued
for a few days, we are now as anxious to let alone as was the
eager huntfer when he overtook the grizzly bear. Slowly, but
majestically, the American conscience rose above the scheme of
conquest and buried it. Extent of territory and material achieve-
ment may make a nation big, but it requires moral heroism to
make it great.
* *
The House of Representatives at Washington was very dis-
orderly the other day, and so riotous were the proceedings that
the Speaker "ordered out the mace," whatever that is, and re-
buked the tumultuous members by saying : "Gentlemen, I hope
you will remember that this is the House of Representatives and
not a beargarden." This was rather severe upon the bear gar-
den, and reminds me of old Squire Chandler, formerly Justice of
the Peace at Marbletown. I always thought that he put on too
much dignity and style in his contemptible little court-room, espe-
cially as the District Court was very indulgent and permitted us
to throw books and inkstands at one another, without inflicting
any greater punishment on us than a reprimand. One day a couple
of us were trying an exciting case before the old Squire, and just
as the discussion had reached ninety degrees in the shade, when
the inkstand-throwing had only just begun, he fined us ten dollars
apiece, saying : "I'll teach you gentlemen that you are not in the
District Court now." So Bruin, the Speaker of the bear garden,
might very properly say, when his colony was extremely rude :
" Gentlemen, remember you are not in Congress now."
* *
For a hundred years or so, the Christian churches of England
and America have been sending regiments of missionaries across
the sea to convert the Mohammedans of Asia. They have not
been successful ; and now in a spirit of reciprocity the children of
Islam reply to us and say, " Since you have not been able to con-
vert us, we will try to convert you"; and their missionaries have
already started from Bombay, some to England and others to
America. The Mohammedan invasion has begun, and the stan-
dard of the crescent is already unfurled in the city of New York,
In six weeks we shall see it in Chicago. The propaganda is said
to be under the direction of rich Mohammedans in India, and their
pioneer missionary is Muhamed Alexander Russell Webb, an
American, formerly Consul of the United States at the Philippine
Islands, where he became a Mussulman. He is now founding a
publishing house in the city of New York for the printing of Mo-
hammedan tracts, and very soon he will have a mosque established
there. Some of the New York and Chicago papers have given
him a sneering welcome, and yet their sarcasm had a nervous flut-
ter in it, as if they were a little bit afraid of him and would rather
he had not come. Now, it accidentally happens that I know some-
thing about Muhamed Alexander Russell Webb. An intimate
friend of his is an intimate friend of mine, and for the past two
years I have been permitted to read the letters and lectures of Mr.
Webb. These prove him to be spiritually and intellectually a
very able man ; and I can assure his Christian critics that if they
meet him in a comparison of creeds they will find him able to jus-
tify his own. I advise them to strike at the weak spot in his
armor : the Mohammedan practice of polygamy. It may be true
that this is more social than religious, but it is permitted by the
Moslem church and therefore it attaches to the faith. Mr. Webb
\vill find it a sttimbling-block in his way.
M. M. Trumbull.
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